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1 Introduction
Environmental and health policy issues often involve commodities combining ex-
ternal eﬀects (pollution, costs to the healthcare system) and individual eﬀects
(future costs or benefits related to own consumption). Once reasonable eﬀort
to inform the public has been undertaken by the authorities, the perception of
individual eﬀects may remain fuzzy. This paper investigates the triple task of
tax policy (raising public funds, correcting external eﬀects, and signaling missing
information to individuals) and particularly the policy-maker’s conflict between
budgetary and informational objectives.
Policy design is particularly delicate for commodities that are detrimental
to consumers’ welfare through multiple channels. Broad-spectrum antibiotics
display (apart from the obvious benefits) a double negative impact. At the in-
dividual level they clear the way to opportunistic infection by more resistant
germs; at the societal level, they enhance the resistance of the germs involved
in contagious diseases.1 In the case of tobacco, we have on the one hand, dis-
eases related to individual consumption, and on the other hand the social damage
from passive smoking and the cost to the healthcare system. High levels of alco-
hol consumption exhibit the same double negative eﬀect. Risky driving exposes
drivers themselves and also others to accidents, whose costs are partly private
and partly social.2 For a discussion on environmental policies, the reader can see
the conclusion of the paper.
The appropriate tax level depends on the constraints faced by the policy-
maker. The Pigouvian tax, set at the marginal damage, is eﬃcient only if the
economy is otherwise undistorted. When the policy-maker needs revenue to fi-
nance public activities, the Ramsey rule stipulates that inelastic demands must
be taxed more. Both arguments are combined in Sandmo (1975): for commodi-
ties causing externalities, a simplified lesson is that the optimal tax is the sum
of the Pigouvian term (the marginal external cost) and the Ramsey term (the
inverse of the elasticity of demand), both corrected by factors accounting for the
level of distortion in the economy. If the budget constraint of the policy-maker is
suﬃciently tight and demand suﬃciently inelastic, optimal taxes are well above
the Pigouvian level, without contradicting orthodox theory. Increasing need for
public expenditures may explain increasing taxes over the years.
This view applies to excise taxes on tobacco. A vast empirical literature
has tried to establish the exact magnitude of smoking externalities. Results
1Some broad-spectrum antibiotics decrease the individual’s immunological response; as a
consequence, he may get new diseases. For many antibiotics based on penicillin (used to treat,
e.g., bronchitis, otitis and tonsillitis), possible side eﬀects are candida albicans and herpes. See
Levy (1992) for the medical viewpoint and Brown and Layton (1996) for an excellent economic
analysis of the external eﬀects.
2For an empirical analysis of driving externalities and Pigouvian taxes, see Edlin and Karaca-
Mandic (2003).
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are subject to considerable controversy, as Chaloupka and Warner (2000) review;
nevertheless departure from the Pigouvian rule is well documented and there is an
agreement that tobacco taxes are typically higher than marginal external eﬀects.
Theoretically, this simply means than the Pigouvian term could be well behind
the Ramsey one, a possibility that is seldom mentioned in empirical studies.
The classical approaches assume that economic agents have perfect percep-
tion of all individual eﬀects of their consumption. We relax this assumption
to consider the policy-maker as the informed party: he can collect and process
detailed evidence and data and rely on expert advice about all the aspects of
health and environmental issues relevant to economic agents. Moreover, given
the public good nature of information, one of the policy-maker’s objectives is
obviously to transmit it to consumers. However, once all direct instruments have
been employed (education, information campaigns, etc.), consumers may remain,
by and large, underinformed. By exploring the possibility of simultaneously pro-
viding signals and incentives with taxes, we oﬀer an interpretation of tax policy
for which the Ramsey-Sandmo theory is insuﬃcient.3
Our baseline is that the policy-maker wishes to promote the public interest.
The marginal cost of public funds is a crucial ingredient of the analysis; like the
externality, it enters in the social welfare function but is neglected by agents
at the moment of choice. The policy-making process is analyzed as a game in
which the government wants to influence consumers’ behaviors through tax policy,
consumers being rational and Bayesian. In our view, whenever some imperfection
impedes economic eﬃciency, taxes must be understood as a metaphor of the
entire comprehensive policy package, also comprising contracts, bans, standards
and norms.4 ,5
The policy-maker is aware of the signaling property of the chosen policy and
will take any opportunity to distort the tax provided the total eﬀect on consump-
tion (through incentives and beliefs) is favorable to social welfare.6 Consumers
anticipate this threat and, at the equilibrium, the tax is distorted away from the
Ramsey-Sandmo level.7 Indeed, the Ramsey-Sandmo tax “reveals” the param-
eter that the consumer does not precisely perceive: the parameter aﬀects the
3In the case of tobacco, which is a mere example, our explanation is based on the necessity
to improve consumers’ information, and is complementary to that in Gruber and Köszegi (2003)
which relies on a complete information model of addiction.
4Anti-smoking measures indeed comprise a large span of instruments, like advertising bans,
prohibition of sales to minors, smoke-free areas, etc.
5Cheap talk has been recently used to study warning labels by Hanson (2003). In his model
an informed regulator is empowered to require one or several warning labels on a drug, and
may also be empowered to ban the drug. This selection between good (not banned) and bad
(banned) drugs is based on relatively coarse policy instruments (cheap talk and bans).
6A similar form of paternalism is found in Benabou and Tirole (2004).
7Although the impossibility to set taxes at their second-best levels also arises when no
external eﬀects exist, situations with externalities present the most interesting examples and
provide a primary justification for the utilization of the tax.
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elasticity of demand, which in turn aﬀects the impact of the tax. By choosing
a tax slightly below the second-best, the policy-maker signals smaller individual
eﬀects, which enhances consumption and consequently the tax revenue; the eﬀect
on consumers’ welfare is negative but of second order whereas the eﬀect on the
policy-maker’s budget is positive and of first order.
The analysis of the fully revealing equilibrium shows that the above conflict
results in taxes lying between the Pigouvian and the Ramsey-Sandmo taxes.
The informative role of the tax is not, per se, a cause of overtaxation, quite the
contrary. However, we show that a small diﬀerence in the severity of individual
eﬀects causes a large diﬀerence of the equilibrium tax. In a sense, an amplification
of minor diﬀerences can be seen as an important characteristic of informative
taxation that the theory of the second-best cannot justify.
A technical remark is necessary at this stage. The level of welfare losses is
not monotonic with the level of the tax, therefore signaling costs have an unusual
structure that classical models do not exhibit. In the proof of the uniqueness of
the fully revealing equilibrium, Mailath (1987) is inapplicable.
Plan Section 2 presents the terms of the policy dilemma. Section 3 defines the
equilibrium. After a few results on the structure of the government’s preferences
(Section 4), we characterize the game’s unique fully-revealing equilibrium (Section
5). All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The Consumers
Consumers live two periods and their period-2 utility is negatively aﬀected by
period-1 consumption x1. Preferences can be written as
(1) U [x1] + x2 − θx1 − ηx1,
where U is increasing, concave and twice continuously diﬀerentiable over R+. The
consequences of x1 on period-2 utility pass through two distinct channels:
• The term−θx1 measures side eﬀects due to the consumer’s own consump-
tion in period 1. The intensity θ is not precisely known to consumers. The
cumulative distribution function F (θ) and its density f(θ), both supported
in [θ, θ], represent consumers’ priors on θ. In general, f is continuous and
non-negative on the support.
• The term −ηx1 indicates the negative externality that depends on x1, i.e.
average period-1 consumption in the economy. The intensity η is supposed
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to be known to all the agents,8 nevertheless consumers do not internalize
the social consequences of x1.
Individual consumption is assumed to be unobservable. This implies that the
government is constrained to impose a linear tax on commodity x, denoted by t.
The representative consumer solves
(2)
(
max
x1,x2
E [U [x1] + x2 − θx1] ,
s.t. : (p1 + t)x1 + p2x2 =W.
where the expected value of utility is conditional on the consumer’s information;
p1 and p2 are the prices for, respectively, period-1 and -2 consumption, and W is
the consumer’s endowment. We assume that W is large enough for x1 and x2 to
be strictly positive.
We normalize p2 to 1 and p1 to 0 without loss of generality since the support
of θ can be translated to account for the (exogenous) price. Then we substitute
the budget constraint into the objective function and drop the subscripts to write
the first period consumption as x. The simplified consumer’s program is9
(3) max
x
E [U [x] +W − (θ + t)x] .
As a consequence, consumption choice x∗ depends on the consumer’s information
and on the tax rate t
(4) x∗[Eθ, t] solves U 0[x] = Eθ + t,
With U = log,the previous reads
(5) x∗[Eθ, t] =
1
Eθ + t
.
2.2 Social Welfare and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds
The policy-maker maximizes social welfare, i.e. the consumers’ utility once the
externality, the fiscal impact of the tax policy and the exact value of side eﬀects
are taken into account. The policy-maker is constrained by the fact that the tax
t must be linear, by preexisting distortions (the marginal cost of public funds)
and by his supposed inability to commit to a policy that informs truthfully on
the value of side eﬀects θ.
The policy-maker is benevolent in that he evaluates consumption in con-
sumers’ best interest, but he practices a variety of paternalism since he does
8This is the simplest assumption since with our specification, consumption does not depend
on η.
9Notice that the linear part in the preferences also represent the utility from goods other
than x.
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not value truthful information per se, and would deceive consumers provided this
induces “better” behavior.
All consumers being identical, in equilibrium x¯ = x, and the policy-maker’s
objective function can be represented, for t = 0, as
(6) U [x] +W − (θ + η)x+ S − (1 + λ)R,
where S is the consumer’s surplus from public expenditures R (R and S are
fixed). The government raises the exogenous amount R with general taxation
(income-, capital-tax, or other levies) at the welfare cost (1 + λ)R, with λ > −1.
The parameter λ is the “shadow cost” of public funds; it represents the distortion
due to the raising of fiscal revenue.10
When the government introduces a tax t on good x and revenue tx is devoted
to reducing preexisting taxes (revenue accruing from other fiscal sources isR−tx),
(6) becomes, after simplification,
(7) U [x] +W − (θ + η − λt)x+ S − (1 + λ)R.
Comparing (3) and (7), we see that the policy-maker’s objective function diﬀers
from the consumer’s in three ways: the government has superior information on θ
and he takes into account both η and λ. In fact the consumer does not internalize
that his contribution tx will replace revenue from other distortionary taxes in the
economy.
Dropping constant terms, we get a reduced form of the policy-maker’s objec-
tive function
(8) SW [x, t, θ] ≡ U [x]− (θ + η − λt)x.
Fiscal revenue tx being small compared to R, we assume for simplicity that λ
remains constant whatever t. Though the sign of λ is not restricted a priori and
depends on the structure of preexisting taxes (in particular their eﬃciency) and
on how they interact with the new tax,11 we assume throughout the paper that
λ ≥ 0.12
The assumption λ ≥ 0 implies that preexisting taxes inflict a welfare cost
larger than R and relates to the debated “double dividend” eﬀect (Pearce, 1991).
According to this literature, a revenue-neutral substitution of environmental taxes
for other taxes might oﬀer a double dividend: not only does it improve the
environment but it also reduces the costs of the tax system through cuts in
distortionary taxes (see Goulder, 1995). To intuit this result, assume that x
10In the Ramsey model of taxation, λ would be the (endogenous) Lagrange multiplier as-
sociated with the government’s budget constraint. For partial equilibrium models (where λ is
exogenous), see, e.g., the theory of regulation (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993).
11For a concise discussion, see Ballard and Fullerton (1992) and Goulder (1995).
12Results in the case λ < 0 are available in a previous version of the paper (see Barigozzi and
Villeneuve, 2003).
6
and the other taxed goods (labor included) are gross substitutes. In that case,
typically, the tax t reduces the consumption of x and increases the consumption of
the other taxed goods. Thus total fiscal revenue increases and taxes on the other
goods can be reduced, which attenuates distortions. Notice that we could also
reason in terms of relative eﬃciency: when λ > 0, a tax on good x is relatively
less distortionary than preexisting taxes.
2.3 Constrained Eﬃcient Allocations
The first-best allocation is defined as the allocation that maximizes consumers’
utility when θ is known, η is internalized, and rising funds does not generate
distortion (λ = 0). This gives xFB(θ) = U 0−1[θ + η]. This allocation can be
decentralized even for unobservable x with the Pigouvian linear tax t = η.
We define the second-best allocation as the best the policy-maker can achieve,
with consumers perfectly informed on θ, when he is constrained to a linear tax
on x and the marginal cost of public funds is not zero. This can be written as
follows
(9)
(
max
t
U [x]− (η + θ − λt)x,
s.t. : x = U 0−1[θ + t],
where the constraint on x corresponds to consumers’ reaction function (4) when
θ is known. Straightforward rearrangement of the first-order condition leads to
the Ramsey-Sandmo rule13
(10)
tSB(θ)− t
tSB(θ)
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ε
,
where ε ≡ −∂x∗∂t
t
x∗ is the tax elasticity of demand, and t =
η
1+λ . Note that, in
the second-best tax, the Pigouvian term t (the marginal external cost) and the
Ramsey term (the inverse of the elasticity of demand) are both corrected for the
tax distortion λ.
To pursue the analysis, we need two additional restrictions on U that we
maintain throughout the paper. Let π(x) = −xU
000[x]
U 00[x] be the index of relative
prudence of U . The first condition implies that program (9) is concave:
Concavity. π is not restricted for λ = 0. If λ > 0, then π 6 2 + 1/λ.14
The second one facilitates the characterization of the second-best policy and
requires that −x
0[s]
x[s] (relative variation of demand) decreases as the price increases
(the proof is direct):
13A similar expression can be found in Sandmo (1975). See also Bovenberg and van der Ploeg
(1994).
14Denote U 0−1 by X. The first- and second-order conditions of (9), t − t = − λ1+λ
X
X0 and
(t− t)X 00+ 1+2λ1+λ X 0 6 0, yield
−λXX00
X0 6 −(1+ 2λ)X 0. Conditions on concavity directly follow.
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Monotone relative variation (MRV). π > 1.
Both conditions are satisfied by a fairly large range of function, including log,
for which π = 2, and CRRA utility functions x
1−α
1−α with 0 6 α = π−1 6 1+1/λ if
λ > 0. Moreover, for small degrees of distortion (as measured by λ), the condition
on concavity becomes extremely loose.
Proposition 1 (Second-best Tax) Under Concavity and MRV, tSB(θ) increases
for λ > 0. If λ = 0, tSB(θ) = η.
The intuition is that, larger side eﬀects discouraging consumption more, and
small consumption being relatively inelastic, fiscal revenue is partly preserved by
larger taxes: the higher the individual risk, the higher the tax.
With U = log, we have
(11)
½
tSB(θ) = η + λθ,
xSB(θ) = 1η+(1+λ)θ .
Proposition 1 proves that, when the objective of the policy-maker is twofold
(correcting the external eﬀect and rising funds), optimal taxes are above the
Pigouvian level. A simple and often overlooked explanation of the observed gap
between cigarette taxes and tobacco externality is the existing distortions in the
fiscal system. Moreover, an increasing need of revenue on the part of the policy-
maker can explain increasing taxes over the years.
3 The Influence Game
The timing of the model is as follows: first the policy-maker observes θ, then he
chooses his tax policy, and finally the consumer, observing the tax, updates his
beliefs on θ and chooses his consumption level.
The tax has the two-fold role of providing incentive and information. After
observing the policy, the consumer updates his priors which are then denoted
by µ(t), with µ(t) ∈ ∆([θ, θ]), the set of probability distributions over [θ, θ]. We
denote E(θ|t) by bθ(t).
Definition 1 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies of the
game is a strategy P mapping [θ, θ] into R, a belief µ mapping R into ∆([θ, θ]),
and a consumption rule x∗ mapping ∆([θ, θ])×R into R+ such that:
1. Policies are optimal given beliefs and consumption function:
(12) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ],P(θ) = argmax
t
SW [x∗[bθ(t), t], t, θ].
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2. Beliefs are rational given equilibrium policy:
(13) µ(θ|t) ≡ II{P(θ)=t} · f (θ)R θ
θ II{P(s)=t} · f (s) ds
,
II being the indicator function. Beliefs for oﬀ-equilibrium actions are not
restricted.
3. Consumption is optimal given the observed policy and the beliefs:
(14) x∗[bθ(t), t] = argmax
x
Z θ
θ
[U [x]− (θ + t)x]µ(θ|t)dθ.
4 Policy-maker’s Preferences
In any equilibrium, the larger the side eﬀects, the lower the social welfare: the con-
sumer’s rationality prevents the policy-maker from transforming lead into gold by
clever communication strategies. To see that, let θ1 and θ2 be two possible states
of the world, t1 and t2 two equilibrium policies, and x1 and x2 the consumption
levels induced. If θ1 < θ2, then U [x2]−(η+θ1−λt2)x2 > U [x2]−(η+θ2−λt2)x2.
On the other hand, the incentive constraint of the type-θ1 policy-maker reads:
U [x1]−(η+θ1−λt1)x1 > U [x2]−(η+θ1−λt2)x2.We get: U [x1]−(η+θ1−λt1)x1 >
U [x2]− (η + θ2 − λt2)x2. Thus the social planner’s payoﬀ decreases with respect
to the side eﬀects. In other words, we preclude any perverse mechanism whereby
propaganda can make less desirable states of the world (larger side eﬀects) prefer-
able.
We analyze now the policy-maker’s incentive to distort taxes, i.e. the reasons
why consumers are likely to be suspicious of the policy-maker’s policy and how
suspicious.
We define SW [t,bθ, θ] ≡ SW [x∗[bθ, t], t, θ] as the value of a policy character-
ized by the belief-tax pair (bθ, t) for a government of type θ. Reasoning directly
on belief-tax pairs allows a simpler analysis of incentive constraints. Indeed, in-
centive compatibility for (bθ, t) and (bθ0, t0) can clearly be checked by comparing
SW [t,bθ, θ] with SW [t0,bθ0, θ], and SW [t,bθ, θ0] with SW [t0,bθ0, θ0].
Policies are restricted to induce finite consumption, thus feasible policies are
such that t + bθ > 0. Indiﬀerence curves are not monotonic with respect to the
tax or the belief. The following proposition gives us the properties required to
proceed with the analysis of incentive compatibility.
Proposition 2 (Single-crossing) For all (bθ, t), the tangent of the indiﬀerence
curve for type θ passing through (bθ, t) turns continuously clockwise if λ > 0 as
θ increases. This has two related implications: 1. Indiﬀerence curves related to
two diﬀerent types cross once at most; 2. Upper contours are never interior (the
branches of indiﬀerence curves go to infinity or cross the boundary bθ + t > 0).
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Figure 1 shows the policy-maker’s indiﬀerence curves for U = log, η = 1,
θ = 0, θ¯ = 1, λ = .7 and θ = 1. For all θ, tangents to indiﬀerence curves are
horizontal along the straight line (1 + λ)t + bθ = η + θ, and vertical along the
straight line t+ (1− λ)bθ = η + θ.
Insert Figure 1 Here
We shall verify whether second-best tax policy is implementable in a Bayesian
equilibrium. Suppose the consumer thinks that the policy-maker is playing the
second-best strategy. The tax schedule tSB being invertible, if tSB(θ) is imposed,
the individual can infer θ unambiguously. In fact, the policy-maker faces strong
incentives to provide biased information.
Corollary 1 The second-best allocation is never an equilibrium if λ > 0.
In fact, at (θ, tSB(θ)), for all θ, the tangent of the indiﬀerence curve of the
government is vertical (see proof of Proposition 2): small changes in the tax
have only second-order eﬀects, whereas small changes in the beliefs have first-
order eﬀects on the policy-maker’s objective. Consequently, any policy close to
the second-best but with bθ < θ is preferred: the second-best allocation is not
incentive-compatible, which confirms that the policy-maker has an incentive to
bias tax policy. Next section characterizes the fully informative equilibrium.
Note in contrast that when λ = 0, the second-best allocation is not informative
on side eﬀects (tSB = η). The tax perfectly internalizes the externality, but
consumers’ priors are not updated and x = U 0−1[Eθ + η]. The final allocation
will imply under- or over-consumption with respect to the first-best depending
on the prior distribution and on the value taken in eﬀect by θ.
Remark that the externality η is not essential for incentives to bias informa-
tion. It serves mainly for the realism of the application to health and environment
issues.
5 Fully Revealing Equilibria
Fully informative equilibria are useful for exposing the tradeoﬀ between inform-
ing consumers and setting incentives. Rational consumers anticipate potential
manipulations and we show that the policy-maker is obliged, to gain credibility,
to distort taxes towards lower levels.
We derive in this section the structure of the fully revealing equilibrium and its
uniqueness. The result is not an application of Mailath (1987) since signals have
non-monotonic costs (the minimal cost being reached at tSB) and an appropriate
proof has to be written in full.
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Proposition 3 There is a unique fully revealing equilibrium. The tax rate is the
unique solution to the ordinary diﬀerential equation defining t(θ) :
(15) t0 = − t− t
t− η
1+λ +
λ
1+λ
U 0−1[θ+t]
[U 0−1]0[θ+t]
with the boundary condition t(θ) = tSB(θ). The tax policy t(·) is strictly increasing
and diﬀerentiable; consumption decreases with respect to θ. For values of θ lower
than θ, t < t(θ) < tSB(θ).
Figure 2 shows the fully revealing tax rate for U = log, η = 1, θ = 0, θ = 1
and λ = .3. The diﬀerential equation simplifies to
(16)
t0
1 + λ
= − t− t
t− tSB(θ)
.
Insert Figure 2 Here
The solution to the diﬀerential equation lies between the optimal tax tSB(θ)
and t = η
1+λ (which appeared in the Ramsey-Sandmo equation (10)). On the one
hand, when the tax is close to the optimal tSB, incentives to “improve” beliefs
are strong and the slope of the revealing tax schedule is very steep. On the other
hand, as the tax approaches the suboptimal t, incentives to manipulate beliefs
vanish, and the revealing tax schedule flattens. As the policy-maker would like
consumers to under-estimate side eﬀects, but not too much, at the fully revealing
equilibrium there is a bias towards excessively low taxes. In the case of risky
driving, the tax on x (excess speed) is interpretable as a fine proportional to x
times the probability of being caught. At the fully revealing equilibrium, the
policy-maker is constrained to impose fines that are too low with respect to the
second-best.
To understand the role of t, compare (3) and (8) and remark that, when t = t,
the consumer’s and the policy-maker’s objective functions are perfectly aligned.
This means that, from the policy-maker’s viewpoint, the optimal consumer’s
belief is exactly the true θ. However, if t were always chosen, it would not be
informative on side eﬀects since it does not depend on θ. The agent’s priors
would not be updated and x would always be U 0−1[Eθ + η
1+λ ]. Still, the most
important problem with t is not informational: t is simply systematically too
low because, contrary to the Ramsey tax, it neglects the role of the elasticity of
demand.
Some comparative statics on λ is worth noting. As λ decreases, the slope
of the second-best tax flattens while the tax t shifts towards the value of the
externality η. Both the range of variation of the equilibrium tax and its maximal
value shrink. The intuition is that the conflict between raising fiscal revenues and
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providing information damps and the signaling costs are substantially reduced.
When λ = 0, the second-best tax and t degenerate into the Pigouvian tax η and
the equilibrium cannot be informative.
We mentioned in the introduction the debate on cigarettes taxes. According
to the empirical literature, excise taxes are too high with respect to the negative
externality induced by tobacco consumption. However, since the Ramsey-Sandmo
tax is increasing in individual eﬀects and in the marginal cost of public funds,
the observed level of cigarettes taxes can be explained by second-best theory. On
the other hand, the incentive compatible fully revealing equilibrium tax is always
below the second-best one. Figure 2 illustrates a general argument: the fully
revealing tax is higher than the Pigouvian tax η for the upper tail of the distri-
bution. In other words, the signaling role of tax policy preserves the expected
gap between the observed tax and η. Moreover, the fully revealing tax schedule is
increasing and convex: the higher θ, the higher the variation of the tax induced
by a small change in side eﬀects.
In conclusion, the fully revealing tax schedule significantly amplifies, at the
upper tail of the distribution, minor diﬀerences in side eﬀects. In this sense, and
in this sense only, we can say that more severe side eﬀects are signalled through
drastic taxation.
6 Conclusion
In a previous version of our model (Barigozzi and Villeneuve, 2003), we considered
policies combining informative taxes and information campaigns (“cheap talk”
or costless messages, e.g. warning labels on cigarette packs or on the hazards of
alcoholic beverage). The paper analyzed the relative impact and credibility of
cheap talk with respect to tax policies. However, the expositional and technical
costs are considerable, and the results basically show that the costly message (tax)
is almost suﬃcient to convey information. From a theoretical point of view, this
confirms Manelli’s (1996) finding that, in a signaling game, cheap talk closes but
does not substantially extend the set of equilibrium allocations. If we see taxes as
a proxy for the various imperfect and costly instruments that a policy-maker can
impose to aﬀect cigarette consumption, a practical conclusion is that they are
typically more eﬃcient, in terms of the precision of information conveyed, than
words. From an empirical point of view, there is evidence that short phrases
whose content is too vague to be verifiable (“smoking is harmful to health”) are
often of very limited eﬃcacy, and that a costly tax is taken more seriously than
mere propaganda. Bardsley and Olekalns (1999), working on the impact of health
warnings on cigarette packs, showed that over the past 35 years, price (including
tobacco taxes), real income, and demographic eﬀects explain most of the variation
in tobacco consumption, whereas health warnings on cigarette packs have had a
relatively minor impact.
12
In the text, we focused on health policy issues, that is on the taxation of com-
modities which induce a negative externality and side eﬀects: smoking, alcoholic
beverages, fast driving and antibiotics. Applications of the results in the field of
environmental policies and multinational firms taxation are possible.
When a resource-saving technology emerges, the diﬀusion process could be
blocked by an imprecise perception of potential economies on operating costs.
The policy-maker may decide to encourage the new technology through a fa-
vorable tax policy (large subsidies signal large savings). This decision reduces
adoption cost directly incurred by consumers, which in the long run may be fa-
vorable to the environment to an extent that overpasses the cost in public funds.
When a multinational firm evaluates investment in a host country, the rate of re-
turn of the investment may be partially unknown.15 The government in the host
country may impose a tax on the invested capital, the level of taxation signals to
the firm some credible information about the profitability of its investment.
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A Appendix
In the following, we denote U 0−1 by X. x1 and x2 denote values (consumption)
taken by the function.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Implicit derivation of the FOC of (9) yields
(17) t0SB(θ) = −
H − (1 + λ)X 0
H
,
where H = X 00((1 + λ)t − η) + (1 + 2λ)X 0 < 0 (second-order condition). This
implies that t0SB(θ) > −1, i.e. θ + tSB(θ) increases w.r.t. θ.
The FOC of (9) can be written as
(18) tSB(θ) =
η
1 + λ
− λ
1 + λ
X[θ + tSB(θ)]
X 0[θ + tSB(θ)]
.
To prove the claim, we reason by contradiction. If t0SB < 0, then the RHS de-
creases w.r.t. θ, which, given the MRV hypothesis, implies that θ + tSB(θ) de-
creases w.r.t. θ, a contradiction with the previous paragraph.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Along an indiﬀerence curve (SW =constant), given that X 0 = 1/U 00, we have
(19)
h
X 0((1 + λ)t− η + bθ − θ) + λXi dt+X 0 h(1 + λ)t− η + bθ − θi dbθ = 0.
The derivative with respect to bθ of the slope of the normal vector (i.e. orthogonal
to the tangent) is
(20)
λU 00X
(η + θ − t− (1− λ)bθ)2 ,
which is negative. Single-crossing implies that the two branches of an indiﬀerence
curve go to infinity or cross (at the limit) the boundary bθ+ t = 0 (this precludes
closed curves).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We establish the result in two steps. The first analyzes diﬀerentiable fully-
revealing equilibria; uniqueness in this category is proved. The second step shows
that any fully-revealing equilibrium is essentially identical to the diﬀerentiable
one.
A.3.1 Diﬀerentiable Equilibrium
Reasoning on local incentive compatibility, we find the ordinary diﬀerential equa-
tion satisfied by any fully-revealing equilibrium tax policy and we eliminate so-
lutions with tax rates that do not fall between η
1+λ and the second-best schedule
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(whichever is higher); we check global incentive compatibility along the equi-
librium policy; we search for oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs (i.e. associated with oﬀ-
equilibrium tax rates) that discourage deviations. This gives a unique equilib-
rium.
In the absence of ambiguity, t denotes t(θ) and XE denotes XE(θ) = X(θ +
t(θ)) = U 0−1[θ + t(θ)].
Diﬀerential Equation. The government prefers t(θ) (and the implied consumption)
to t(θ + dθ) and to t(θ − dθ); taking limits we get
(21) X 0EU
0 + λt0XE − (η + θ − λt)X 0E = 0.
Given that the consumer’s first-order condition is U 0 = θ + t, we can eliminate
U 0 to get the ordinary diﬀerential equation
(22) λt0 = −(1 + λ)X
0
E
XE
(t− η
1 + λ
),
which, with X 0E(θ) = (1+ t
0(θ))X 0(θ+ t(θ)) and after rearrangement, is the ODE
of the text.
Monotonicity. The second-order condition is:
(23) 0 > X 02E U 00 +X 00EU 0 + λt00XE + 2λt0X 0E − (η + θ − λt)X 00E,
while the derivative of the first-order condition is:
(24) 0 = X 02E U
00 +X 00EU
0 + λt00XE + 2λt0X 0E −X 0E − (η + θ − λt)X 00E,
Simplifying (23) with (24) we get:
(25) X 0E 6 0.
Global Incentive Compatibility. The first- and second-order conditions ex-
clude infinitesimal deviations. We check that discrete deviations are also pre-
cluded.
Let θ be the true value of the side-eﬀects parameter. Assuming that the
government oﬀers t(bθ), thereby inducing XE(bθ), we calculate the derivative of the
government’s utility with respect to bθ :
X 0E(bθ)U 0[XE(bθ)] + (λt0(bθ)XE(bθ)− (η + θ − λt(bθ))X 0E(bθ))(26)
= X 0E(bθ)((1 + λ)t− η + bθ − θ) + λt0(bθ)XE(bθ).
Simplifying with (22), we find that (26) has the same sign as X 0E(bθ)(bθ − θ). It
follows that (26) is positive for bθ < θ and negative for bθ > θ. This means that
incentive compatibility is satisfied everywhere for equilibrium actions.
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Position of the Solution. In equation (15), the denominator is null (vertical
tangent) if only if t(θ) = tSB(θ). We know from the analysis of (18) that this
value tSB(θ) is unique for each θ.
Assume that t(·) is located below t. Consider an oﬀ-equilibrium tax t1 slightly
above t and denote the associated belief by bθ. Clearly, when the government’s
type is bθ, (bθ, t1) is preferred to (bθ, t(bθ)). The candidate solution is not incentive
compatible. Assume now that t(·) is located above the second-best schedule.
t(·) is necessarily decreasing (while tSB is increasing). As θ increases, t(·) ap-
proaches tSB and t0 goes to −∞. This implies that consumption decreases, which
is impossible.
We conclude that t(·) is located between t and the second-best schedule, and
that it is increasing.
Uniqueness (Boundary Condition). We show that there are incentive com-
patible beliefs associated with oﬀ-equilibrium actions only if the boundary con-
dition t(θ) = tSB(θ) is satisfied.
We reason by contradiction. Let t(·) be a solution to (15) such that t(θ) <
tSB(θ).We already excluded that t(θ) > tSB(θ) and we know that t(θ) is above
η
1+λ
and that t(θ) is strictly increasing. Thus we have maxθ t(θ) = t(θ) < tSB(θ). We
choose an arbitrary (oﬀ-equilibrium) bt in the interval (t(θ), tSB(θ)) and we denote
by bθ the associated belief. We prove that there always exists a type eθ of govern-
ment that prefers (bθ,bt) to (eθ, t(eθ)), which contradicts incentive compatibility.
Clearly, t(bθ) < bt, therefore if bt 6 tSB(bθ), then bt is preferable to t(bθ) for type bθ.
This contradiction implies that necessarily, bt > tSB(bθ). Consider now the solution
T (·) to (15) passing through (bθ,bt). (1) The previous analysis (Position of the
Solution) proves that this solution is decreasing, therefore T hits the second-
best curve between bθ and θ, for a belief denoted eθ. (2) Moreover, for type eθ,
(bθ, T (bθ)) = (bθ,bt) is preferred to (eθ, T (eθ)) = (eθ, tSB(eθ)). Indeed, above the second-
best taxes, the diﬀerential equation selects globally worst choices rather that
globally best choices (see Global Incentive Compatibility). We can conclude
that the policy is not incentive compatible for type eθ. By necessity, we have
t(θ) = tSB(θ).
Now we prove that associating belief θ to any tax rate above tSB(θ) does
not induce deviations. Take any t > tSB(θ). Assume that there is a type of
government bθ for which (θ, t) is a better policy than (bθ, tSB(bθ)) (contradiction with
incentive compatibility). By continuity of the preferences w.r.t. to beliefs, there
exists a type eθ ∈ (bθ, θ) such that (θ, t)) and (eθ, t(eθ)) are equivalent. Call I the
corresponding indiﬀerence curve. This curve cannot intersect the set of policies
that are better than or equivalent to (θ, tSB(θ)) (for type θ) since this would
imply double crossing of the frontier of this upper contour, which is excluded
from Proposition 2. Now remark that both (eθ, tSB(eθ)) and (θ, tSB(θ)) are on the
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same side of I, meaning that they both provide more welfare that policies in
I. This contradicts incentive compatibility for type eθ: (θ, tSB(θ)) is preferred to
(eθ, t(eθ)).
By the same reasoning, we can check that, if for t < t(θ), beliefs are θ, then
t is not attractive: for a government of type θ, the value of imposing t < t(θ) is
smaller than that of imposing (θ, t(θ)).
We conclude that the unique revealing allocation found is an equilibrium.
A.3.2 Any Fully Revealing Equilibrium is Diﬀerentiable
Take a fully-revealing equilibrium. For all consumer beliefs, the government’s
preferences are single-peaked with respect to t (a direct consequence of Convex-
ity), and there are a maximum of two tax rates per θ, tL(θ) and tU(θ) that can
implement the equilibrium welfare. More precisely, tL(θ) 6 tSB(θ) 6 tU(θ)). The
theorem of the maximum ensures that the value of the government’s equilibrium
strategy is continuous with respect to θ, therefore functions tL(·) and tU(·) are
continuous with respect to θ.We denote by ΘL and ΘU the subsets of [θ, θ] lead-
ing to a move in the lower (L) and the upper (U) selection respectively. Notice
that ΘL ∪ ΘU = [θ, θ] and ΘL ∩ ΘU = ∅ (mixed strategies are not considered).
For fixing ideas, the following reasoning assumes that λ > 0.
The first step is to prove that ΘU is not dense in any interval of [θ, θ]. We
reason by contradiction: take J an interval in [θ, θ] in which ΘU is dense. Take
θ0 ∈ J, and a strictly monotonic sequence (θn)n>1 in ΘU converging to θ0. We
prove that for all sequences (θn)n>1,
(27) lim
n→∞
λ
tn − t0
θn − θ0
= −(1 + λ)X
0
E(θ0)
XE(θ0)
(t0 −
η
1 + λ
),
where tn denotes tU(θn). Indeed, incentive constraints (θn should not mimic θ0,
and vice-versa) imply that:
U [XE(θn)]− (η + θn − λtn)XE(θn) > U [XE(θ0)]− (η + θn − λt0)XE(θ0),(28)
U [XE(θn)]− (η + θ0 − λtn)XE(θn) 6 U [XE(θ0)]− (η + θ0 − λt0)XE(θ0).(29)
Therefore, taking a first-order approximation around t0 and θ0 yields
(30)
0 > X 0E(θ0)((1 + λ)t− η)(θn − θ0) + λXE(θ0)(tn − t0) + o(θn − θ0) + o(tn − t0),
(31)
0 6 X 0E(θ0)((1 + λ)t− η)(θn − θ0) + λXE(θ0)(tn − t0) + o(θn − θ0) + o(tn − t0).
The limit of the rate of variations is the same for all sequences, which implies
that tU is diﬀerentiable at θ0, hence diﬀerentiable on interval J, and that it is
driven by (22).
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A solution of the diﬀerential equation (22) situated above the second-best
taxes is not incentive compatible at any point, because the second-order condi-
tion is never satisfied (see paragraph on local incentive compatibility). We can
conclude that strategy tU is not-incentive compatible, and that interval J does
not exist.
It is now easy to conclude that ΘL, being the complementary set (in an inter-
val) of a set ΘU which is not dense anywhere, is dense in [θ, θ]. Consequently, tL
satisfies the diﬀerential equation (22) in a dense subset of [θ, θ], which implies that
it does so everywhere. The lower selection is necessarily equal to the unique dif-
ferentiable equilibrium strategy, since we can apply to tL(·) the reasoning suited
for diﬀerentiable equilibria.
It remains now to prove that ΘU contains a finite number of points. If not,
there would be an accumulation point θ in ΘU around which (27) would be
satisfied, meaning that policies in the neighborhood of θ follow the diﬀerential
equation (22). But in this region of the plan, we proved that policies along (22)
are never incentive compatible (Global Incentive Compatibility), which proves
that ΘU must not contain accumulation points. In other words, ΘU contains a
finite number of points.
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